Wiener noted that "The role of information and the technique of measuring and transmitting information constitute a whole discipline for the engineer, for the neuroscientist, for the psychologist, and for the sociologist". Sociology aside, the neuroscientists and the psychologists inferred "information transmitted" using the discrete summations from Shannon Information Theory. The present author has since scrutinized the psychologists' approach in depth, and found it wrong. The neuroscientists' approach is highly related, but remains unexamined. Neuroscientists quantified "the ability of [physiological sensory] receptors (or other signal-processing elements) to transmit information about stimulus parameters". Such parameters could vary along a single continuum (e.g., intensity), or along multiple dimensions that altogether provide a Gestalt -such as a face. Here, unprecedented scrutiny is given to how 23 neuroscience papers computed "information transmitted" in terms of stimulus parameters and the evoked neuronal spikes. The computations relied upon Shannon's "confusion matrix", which quantifies the fidelity of a "general communication system". Shannon's matrix is square, with the same labels for columns and for rows. Nonetheless, neuroscientists labelled the columns by "stimulus category" and the rows by "spike-count category". The resulting "information transmitted" is spurious, unless the evoked spike-counts are worked backwards to infer the hypothetical evoking stimuli. The latter task is probabilistic and, regardless, requires that the confusion matrix be square. Was it? For these 23 significant papers, the answer is No.
INTRODUCTION
In Cybernetics [1, p. vii] , Professor Norbert Wiener noted that "The role of information and the technique of measuring and transmitting information constitute a whole discipline for the engineer, for the neuroscientist, for the psychologist, and for the sociologist". Note well the mention of non-engineering disciplines. In particular, how psychologists have inferred transmitted information using the discrete summations from Shannon Information Theory [2] has been critically examined by the present author [3] - [6] . However, there has been no comparable scrutiny of the neuroscientists' use of Shannon's summations. The latter use greatly resembles what was done by the psychologists, making criticism not just timely but well-overdue. The task proves non-trivial, and it exposes misinterpretations that have persisted for decades. Further problems exist, but are relegated to future papers, because of the depth required. Regardless, the present work challenges neuroscientists to re-evaluate what can be inferred from animal recordings, especially when taken as models of man.
Sensory neuroscientists have used Shannon Information Theory to quantify "the ability of [physiological sensory] receptors (or other signal-processing elements) to transmit information about stimulus parameters" [7, p. 82] . That usage is scrutinized here, starting with Werner and Mountcastle [8] , who provided the interpretation of Shannon which became the blueprint for neuroscience. Table 1 describes Werner and Mountcastle and some of the significant papers that followed it, which cover a range of dates, species, sensory modalities, and types of stimuli. Some papers varied a single characteristic of their stimuli, one that fills a continuum, such as the depth of thrust of a blunt probe against the skin (experienced as differing pressure). As such, the neurons studied can be those closest to the outside world, the primary afferents. They are typically attached to, or themselves contain, sensory receptors. Other neurons that respond to sensory stimuli rely on input from the peripheral afferents, but are closer to the brain. The cerebral cortex itself can contain neurons that preferentially respond to a Gestalt formed from multiple stimulus features.
Neuroscientists' use of Information Theory has been extremely influential in behavioral science. Unfortunately, as will be shown, the information-theory analyses in the papers listed in Table 1 are meaningless. Attempts to correct the computation, by relating responses back to stimuli ("Decoding"; see below), are likewise futile.
Note well that the information-theory analyses discussed here employed the original discrete summations of Shannon [2] . Smooth integral forms exist, and some neuroscientists have used them. But those are special approaches (e.g., [30] ) having special problems, deserving later critique. However, given the present revelations, neuroscientists' use of the integrals likely will also prove faulty.
II. THE "GENERAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM", THE "CONFUSION MATRIX", AND THE INFORMATION TRANSMITTED In Shannon's own words [2] , his "general communication system" consists of (1) "An information source which produces a message or sequence of messages to be communicated to the receiving terminal", (2) "A transmitter which operates on the message in some way to produce a signal suitable for transmission over the channel", (3) a channel, where "The channel is merely the medium used to transmit the signal from transmitter to receiver", (4) a receiver, where "The receiver ordinarily performs the inverse operation of that done by the transmitter, reconstructing the message from the signal", and (5) a destination, where "The destination is the person (or thing) for whom the message is intended" (the italics within the quotes are the originals).
The sent messages are groups of symbols, such as letters arranged into words and then into sentences [2] . Symbols have probabilities from which the information transmitted in a message can be computed, as follows [2] . Consider n possible events; the one that occurs is the outcome, which is uncertain if n > 1. If each event has a known probability of occurrence, 
In experiments, ( ) k p is set by the experimenters.
A symbol received is from the set of symbols that can be sent, but not all symbols will be received as sent. That is, the system is "noisy". Information transmitted, denoted t I , can be calculated knowing (a) what symbols "k" (events) were sent, (b) what symbols "j" (outcomes) were received, and (c) the number of times a symbol sent as "k" was received as "j", denoted N jk . The latter form the "confusion matrix". 
is the signal equivocation/entropy, and
is the information transmitted. These are averages taken over the course of the message. The base of the logarithms is a positive integer; when set to 2, the information transmitted is in binary information units per symbol, or "bits/symbol". Note that
represents perfect transmission. In the coming details, "signal" will be replaced by "stimulus". Note also that if the n symbols or stimuli are equiprobable (that is,
, and the number of symbols or stimuli that the system can potentially correctly indicate is t I b . Applying a sensory stimulus to an organism that has neurons, such as a man or a cat, may evoke firing of voltage spikes in some of those neurons. Such neurons may respond predictably, within some limit of variability, to changes in some characterizing feature(s) of the stimulus. In particular, the number of neuronal voltage spikes evoked during some sub-interval of the interval in which the stimulus is appliedthe sub-interval called the spike-counting time -will change systematically as the stimulus characteristic is changed. This spike count is the most commonly used of numerous quantities obtainable from neuronal spike trains. For such measures, the mean stimulus-evoked spike count tends to smoothly, systematically change in response to smooth, systematic change(s) in the sensory stimulus. Those measures include the latency of the first stimulus-evoked spike (see for example [31] ; [25] , for mean response time; [27] ) or interspike intervals (e.g., [23] ) or "the principal components of the temporal waveform of the response" ( [12, p. 168] ; also [14] - [16] , [18] ). Conclusions reached presently about the viability of information theory in neuroscience will apply equally well regardless of the particular neuronal response that has been used in computing WM t I , , because those conclusions do not intrinsically depend upon the particulars of the neuronal response measure, but rather on how it is employed in computing WM t I , . Likewise, the present conclusions also apply when information-transmitted is computed from more than one simultaneous measurable stimulus-evoked neuronal response, i.e., a vector of responses, representing an ensemble of (usually mutually neighboring) neurons (e.g., [32] ).
Whether the stimulus is varied along a single continuum or along many simultaneously (in the case of a Gestalt), each application of the same stimulus could, empirically, produce a different count of the voltage spikes evoked within the counting time. The likelihood that a given count lies within any two limits, over repeated applications of the stimulus, can be approximated for infinitely close limits by a probability density function having a mean and a variance. That is, spike count is stochastic, so that the response to the stimulus appears to be inherently "confused". The degree of that confusion is what neuroscientists believe that they quantify through their use of Information Theory. (The reason for the qualifying italics will hopefully soon become clear.) Experiments are typically done under conditions such that each spike-count distribution is believed to be unchanging (i.e., stationary). To sensory neuroscientists, all of this makes a particular stimulus a potential Shannon "event", because it evokes in the neuron, on average, a predictable "outcome". The measured spiketrain feature was taken as Shannon's "symbol received" and the stimulus characteristic being varied (e.g., intensity) was taken as Shannon's "symbol sent". Of course, if the latter bore no relation at all to the former, then the transmitted information was zero;
The difference between any "event" and its evoked "outcome" could be attributed to "noise", which neuroscientists interpreted as the probabilistic nature of the evoked spike count. As Smith et al. [7, p. 94 ] declared concerning spike counts taken from primary afferent neurons, "The ability of an organism to make decisions about stimulus events is limited by the resolution of its peripheral sensory receptors … The concepts and methods of information theory [omitted citation] have provided a means for addressing the resolving power of these receptors". Other workers replaced "peripheral sensory receptors" with "sensory neurons", with the understanding that peripheral sensory receptors, regardless of further processing of their output at "higher" brain-ward neurons, did indeed provide the ultimate limit. That is, WM t I , was computed from neuronal responses (whether one neuron or several, and regardless of their bodily location) on the tacit presumption that WM t I , had a putative maximum max , WM t I that identified the neuron's ability to encode the stimulus characteristic(s) altered by the experimenter.
B. The Sensory Neuroscientists' Confusion Matrix 1) General description
In the neuroscientists' confusion matrix, in contrast to Shannon's, the "symbols sent" ("events") are stimuli, divided into ranges called stimulus categories. The "symbols received" ("outcomes") are numbers of voltage spikes evoked in the neuron over some counting time. As noted above, repetitions of a given stimulus can produce different numbers of spikes within some agreed-upon counting time; there is presently no means of determining the "correct" counting time, should one exist. Perhaps for this reason, neuroscientists treated ranges of spike counts as the labels for the rows of the confusion matrix, spike-count categories. Fig. 2 shows such a confusion matrix, but in which (unlike the literature) the number of stimulus categories equals the number of spike-count categories, i.e., a square matrix as in Fig. 1 . Experiment-wise, each stimulus category was typically represented by a single stimulus, which differed from those in other categories (for a rare exception see [17] , in which 37 stimuli were sometimes grouped into 3 categories). Thus, each matrix entry in Fig. 2 is typically the number of times that a particular stimulus evoked a spike count that fell within the particular spike-count category, i.e.
( )
is "the probability of giving stimulus k" whereas
is "the probability that stimulus k was given, given a spike count in spike-count category j".
As noted, square matrices are not typical of the literature. Fig. 2 represents what a confusion matrix might look like if firing characteristics were to be used to "work backwards" to infer what the evoking stimuli had been. That exercise has sometimes been attempted (see below). The actual construction of the majority of neuroscientists' confusion matrices will now be described.
2) The neuroscientists' confusion matrix for stimuli characterized by values along a smooth continuum
Werner and Mountcastle [8] provided the archtype sensory neuroscience confusion matrix. All subsequent papers, whether using sums or integrals to compute information transmitted, follow their model. Werner and Mountcastle recorded spikes evoked in primary afferent neurons by a narrow probe quickly applied and held for 1 second or less against the center of touch-sensitive Iggo corpuscles in the shaven hairy skin of the hind limb of cats and monkeys (the specific monkey species was not mentioned, which became a common error). The stimulus intensities were the depths-ofdepression of the probe, each possible value equidistant in micrometers (microns) from its nearest neighbors, each its own stimulus-intensity category. Probe-evoked spikes were counted for "a time which begins within 100-150 msec.
[milliseconds] of stimulus onset and lasts for about 4-500 msec." [8, p. 379] . Spike-count categories were made by dividing the stimulus-evoked spike counts into groups differing by 2 spikes. Table 1 lists the widths (W, in numbers of spikes) of the spike-count categories, as well as C, the numbers of columns, and R, the numbers of rows, in the confusion matrices, for Werner and Mountcastle [8] and subsequent others. If C=R, a matrix is square. The duration of application of the stimulus could be varied, as could the spike-counting duration. The spike-count categories would inevitably not all have equal widths; empirically, mean spike-firing rates are nonlinear functions of relevant stimulus characteristics. Hence, experimenters usually chose stimuli at equal intervals, along a range of the relevant stimulus characteristic within which the evoked firing rate is a straight line when plotted versus either linear or logarithmic scales of said characteristic. The experimenters likewise chose equal widths for their spikecount categories, except perhaps the uppermost and lowermost categories, which might be extended to their respective infinities.
3) The neuroscientists' confusion matrix for stimuli characterized by their Gestalt
Here, as in the examples above which varied the stimulus intensity, each stimulus is its own stimulus category.
Tovee et al. [15] provide an example of brain recordings in response to Gestalt stimuli. The stimuli were "4 face stimuli" [15, p. 642 ] which "were monkey or human, usually in frontal view, but in some cases in profile view" [15, p. 642] . The faces were presented to attentive macaque monkeys who were trained to fixate at 5 different points of any image, actual visible points that were presented either at the center of the image, or at the edge of the image and towards any of the four corners of the video monitor used for viewing. The subjects thus maintained a constant behavior, giving altogether 4x5=20 "stimulus categories". Fixation points were "blinked off 200 ms [milliseconds] before the test stimulus appeared" [15, p. 641] . The latter lasted 500 ms.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE USE OF SHANNON INFORMATION THEORY IN SENSORY NEUROSCIENCE
Neuroscientists' use of Shannon Information Theory has a fatal problem concerning the interpretation of the Shannon concepts of "event" and "outcome", as follows.
A. Shannon's Requirements (i.e., The Theory) 1) Each "event" is from a limited set of distinct things, and evokes an "outcome", one of the possible "events"
For "events" (symbols transmitted) and "outcomes" (symbols received), Shannon [2] used, as examples, English letters. They form a limited set whose members are mutually distinguishable, insofar as a sent "A" received as an "A" will not normally be confused with a "B". To Shannon, each "event" had just one "outcome", that is one of the "events".
2) The Shannon confusion matrix is square
The symbol received need not be the one transmitted. Regardless, Shannon's confusion matrix has rows labelled by the same symbols as its columns; the matrix is square (Fig. 1) .
B. Sensory Neuroscience (i.e., The Practice)
1) Each "event" is from a limited set of distinct things, and evokes an "outcome" -not one of the possible "events", but altogether different in character a) Each "event" is from a limited set of distinct things The sensory neuroscientists' "events" are stimuli -or perhaps stimulus categories. This uncertainty arises because a stimulus characterization (such as intensity) forms what, to our measuring instruments, seems to be a continuum (i.e., macroscopically smooth, even if bumpy at the quantum scale). And even when the stimulus is a Gestalt such as a face, small changes in the face (along one or more dimensions) might be indiscriminable to the judge (the human eye, and the mind connected to it) -such that faces represent a multidimensional continuum. In fact, in all of the 23 papers scrutinized here, each stimulus category k contained a stimulus of just one characterization from the relevant set of characterizations (face, shape, intensity, or whatever).
Compelling reasons for that, which are not mentioned in the literature, are as follows. Consider that if different stimuli within a given stimulus category differ sufficiently that the resulting evoked spikes consistently fall into different spikecount categories, then each of the differing stimuli is acting as if it could be placed within a separate stimulus category. Conversely, if m different stimuli within the given stimulus category are sufficiently close in character that the resulting spike counts fall within just one spike-count category, then those m different stimuli are emulating a single stimulus repeated m times. These problems confuse the interpretation of
. The confusion is avoided only when each stimulus category is restricted to a single stimulus which differs from all the others employed, such that the difference between "stimulus" and "stimulus category" disappears.
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Row totals n -k -2 1 Fig. 2 . The "confusion matrix" of sensory neuroscience.
b) Each "event" evokes an "outcome" -not one of the possible "events", but altogether different in character
The neuroscientists' "outcome" is a spike count. Or is it a spike-count category? Neuroscientists don't clarify this. Regardless, neither a spike-count category nor a spike count is a stimulus. Hence, regardless of whether the "outcomes" are taken as spike counts or as spike-count categories, "outcomes" do not have the same character as "events".
But can "outcomes" be made to have the same character as "events"? To compute a meaningful true t I , would require working backwards from each stimulus-evoked spike count to the stimulus that the spike-count implied, which would not necessarily be the stimulus actually given. To attempt working backwards, how would the number of stimulus categories have to compare to the number of spike-count categories? The answer is that each spike-count category j (representing a row in the sensory neuroscientists' confusion matrix) must have a single corresponding, "correct" stimulus category k (representing a column of the matrix). And even so, specification of the implied stimulus category would be uncertain, because (1) the relation between stimulus and mean spike count, is usually nonlinear (there are too many supporting references for this) and (2) the spike count evoked by a given stimulus is stochastic, as noted above. This issue is pursued further in Section V, below.
2) The neuroscience confusion matrix is not square
Did the papers discussed above meet the requirement of equal numbers of spike-count categories and stimulus categories, that is, a square confusion matrix? Table 1 lists the numbers of rows and columns in the respective published matrices, and shows that none were square. Indeed, their creators revealed no inkling that squareness was required.
V. APPARENT EXCEPTIONS: "DECODING"
Shannon's system [2] contains an encoder (the transmitter) and a decoder (the receiver). The latter was assumed to convert the "noisy signal" back into a message containing a subset of the symbols that are available to form the message that was originally given to the transmitter. Thus the engineer's confusion matrix has rows and columns having the same labels. Did sensory neuroscientists ever attempt to "decode" the stimulus-evoked neuronal firing, in the sense that a decoder "receives a spike train as input and guesses which stimulus evoked the spike train" [25, p. 200 ]? Yes -for example, Georgopoulos and Massey [33] and Furukawa and Middlebrooks [31] had rows labelled the same as columns, that is, by the stimulus characteristic employed. They accomplished the seemingly impossible task that is sometimes called "reconstruction", "simulation", or "decoding" (e.g., [25] , [35] ) by inferring the entries in their square confusion matrices, based upon their recorded responses of neurons, and using statistical models based upon varieties of assumptions. The methods are too elaborate to be described here. Importantly, neither paper ( [31] , [33] ) showed any explicit understanding of why their matrix was square. Georgopoulos and Massey [33] , for example, merely cited Sakitt [34] , who had used square matrices in psychophysics.
Let us denote the inferred values of true t I , as (inferred) , true t I
. Consider what would happen if circumstances existed which favored back-calculation. For example, the neurons examined in [8] - [11] showed remarkably reproducible spike firing, in that the variance of the firing rate to a given stimulus was remarkably low. And there was evidently a method to lower the variance-to-mean ratio in the counted spikes, namely, to employ a longer recording epoch ≈ , the result from psychophysical "absolute identification" experiments; see [3] ), by simply (1) altering the number of different stimuli (i.e., the size of the stimulus set) and their spacing along the stimulus characteristic that was manipulated, while simultaneously (2) gerrymandering the number and widths of the spike-count categories. And close reading of [7] and [8] - [11] suggests that this is, in fact, what had been attempted. Fig. 3 illustrates such a case, given simplifying assumptions (for illustration's sake) of equal numbers of spike-count and stimulus categories, and distributions of equal variance. Here, the distribution of spikecounts evoked by each different stimulus lies effectively within the corresponding spike-count category. In such cases, there would be little purpose to computing Catego ry 7 Probability density Fig. 3 . Relation of stimulus categories to distributions of spike counts when information transmitted, t I , approximates the stimulus information, S I . A stimulus representing each stimulus category evokes neuronal voltage spikes which are counted over some counting time. Evoked spike count, over repeated presentations of the stimulus, is imagined as being distributed according to a Gaussian probability density function, assumed identical for the different given stimulus intensities. Tracing backward from spike-count category to stimulus category leaves little ambiguity about which recorded spike-count corresponded to which stimulus category. Now consider the opposite assumption about the distribution of spike-counts for any spike-count category, namely, that it is very broad -so broad, in fact, that
. Fig. 4 illustrates broad distributions. This is the sort of situation found, for example, in Tolhurst [13] , in which spike-count "variance is usually 2-5 times the average response" [13, p. 410 ], resulting in a mean WM t I , of 0.71 bits (i.e., less than 2 correctly identified choices) across 23 neurons, given 14 different stimuli ( 81 . 3 = S I bits). Then, backwards-calculation of stimulus category from spike count would be a matter of probability (as used in Signal Detection Theory, for example; see [36] , [37] ) rather than certainty, so that
; indeed, (inferred) ,true t I could well approach zero. WM t I , was indeed, in many of the papers listed in Table 1 , remarkably small (data omitted).
There is great irony here, in that the very reason that Shannon's Information Theory was applied to neurons in the first place -their stochastic firing -may be the reason why such a computation cannot work. t I could be yet closer to zero if the numbers of spike-count categories and stimulus categories were unequal; in such a case, the back-assignment of spike-count to the hypothetical evoking stimulus would involve even more miss-assignment, which, on average, would reduce (rather than inflate) (inferred) ,true t I .
Probability den sity
Stimulus-attribute continuum Spike-count continuum Fig . 4 . Relation of stimulus categories to distributions of spike counts when information transmitted, t I , is likely to be substantially less than the stimulus information, S I . After Fig. 3 , each spike-count distribution is Gaussian, and is identical for the different given stimulus intensities, but the variances are substantially broader than in Fig. 3 -so broad that tracing backward from a given spike-count to the stimulus that evoked it is effectively impossible. The stimulus-attribute and spike-count continua are pictured as being open at their top and bottom; otherwise, the spike-count distributions would become increasingly skewed as the end spike-count categories are approached (as seen in psychology "absolute identifications" [4] ).
For there to be any possibility of inferring true t I , from neuronal responses, the neuronal code must be understood for the stimulus property that the experimenter is manipulating, in order that neuronal firing can be appropriately apportioned into response categories that are appropriate for the given stimulus categories. And yet, without such knowledge,
is currently used to choose between different possible neuronal codes (e.g., spike count versus first-spike latency versus principal components; see for example [12] , [14] - [16] , [18] , [25] , [27] , [28] , [31] ).
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Werner and Mountcastle [8] first described an interpretation of Shannon's Information Theory [2] , one later adopted by many neuroscientists, to estimate t I , the information transmitted by sensory neurons. The computation depends upon the numerical entries in Shannon's "confusion matrix", which quantifies the fidelity of Shannon's "general communication system". The Shannon matrix has columns labelled by symbol sent ("event") and rows labelled by symbol received ("outcome"). Shannon assumed that for each "event" there is only one "outcome", one of the possible "events". Therefore Shannon's matrix is necessarily square. But in the sensory neuroscientists' matrix, columns were labelled by "stimulus category" and rows were labelled by "spike-count category", neuronal voltage spikes being the response to stimuli. This does not yield a true t I , because spikegeneration is stochastic, with a mean stimulus-dependence that is nonlinear. true t I , could hypothetically still be computed if spike counts could somehow be related backwards to their implied stimulus, given a square confusion matrix. Squareness was therefore checked for, in 23 significant sensory neuroscience studies. Squareness was not found, and indeed, neither Werner and Mountcastle [8] nor any of their successors explained why they had ignored Shannon's requirement of identical labelling for rows and columns. The t I 's computed in those studies over five decades, here denoted WM t I , , are
gratuitous, yet they have been given great cachet and continue to be computed. Table 1 . Details of papers that express information transmitted based on stimulus-evoked spike counts, and details of the respective confusion matrices. The papers need not represent the relative contributions, in quantity or quality, of the respective authors or laboratories. Some details were unclear, but efforts to contact authors of papers that were more than a few years old sometimes proved futile. "W" is width of spike-count category in units of "spikes". "C" is number of confusion-matrix columns (stimulus categories). "R" is number of confusion-matrix rows (spike-count categories). V means "Varied". That is, when the number of spike-count categories is fixed, the number of spikes differentiating each spike-count category from its neighbors is determined by the range of firing rates of the neuron; likewise, the latter determines the number of spike-count categories when the number of spikes differentiating each spike-count category is fixed. An extreme case was Gnadt and Breznen [17, p. 3528] , who established a different number of response categories for each neuron, by dividing the range of firing rate of that neuron by the "number of distinguishable levels" for that neuron (their Table 2 
